PhalanxSwarm Command Center
The Zero-Trust Treasury Firewall for Autonomous AI Agents
A TEE signature proves which model answered, but not what it was asked. PhalanxSwarm enforces on-chain DAO-pinned system prompt hashes and contract-synthesized audit facts, neutralizing prompt injection and revoking keys in the same transaction at the protocol consensus layer.
Prompt Injection Defense
100% of injection attacks stopped across 12 vectors and 3 production LLMs with 0 NEAR stolen.
Autonomous Circuit Breaker
Attacking transaction executes Promise::delete_key, killing access immediately.
Contract-Built Audit Facts
Prevents the agent from forging audit evidence. The contract verifies both prompt hash and evidence hash.
Chain Signatures & Intents
EIP-1559 MPC execution confirmed on Base Sepolia, with 1Click dry quotes bound to each signed request. No agent holds an EVM key.
This tab runs the compiled contract (phalanx_core.wasm) locally, in your browser. The same steps also ran on NEAR testnet; each step's details link to its transaction.
stand-in (no TEE) Set NEARAI_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, or OPENAI_API_KEY for live models. Without a key, agents use the deterministic stand-in.
Changing a setting restarts the local contract.
- wasm
- —
- sha256
- —
- block
- —
- 1Click
- auto · dry
- agents
- —
A TEE signature proves which model answered, not what it was asked.
The NEAR contract checks both: the DAO pins the auditor's prompt and the contract writes its evidence, so a signed approval over a self-written prompt or invented facts fails. When an agent breaks a critical rule, the attacking transaction deletes its access key.
- Step 1ACTIVE
Poisoned invoice
Mallory, an AI payables agent, reads an invoice that swaps in a scammer's bank details.
Mallory-AP-Agent · rep …How the contract guarantees this
Mallory, a third-party accounts-payable agent, reads an invoice with a forwarded “our bank details changed” message. The payment it asks for is small and uses an allowed chain and route. It also lacks a Sentinel audit, which on its own is a warning. The unapproved recipient is the critical violation: it quarantines Mallory and deletes its key.
- Step 2
Forged evidence
Cipher, a hacked agent, asks the auditor to approve a doctored copy of the payment's facts.
Cipher-Compute · GPU Vendor AHow the contract guarantees this
Cipher is compromised and knows the DAO-pinned audit prompt. Its real payment carries a “changed bank details” memo. It asks the model to approve a copy of the facts with a harmless memo. The model really signs. The contract compares the audit's input with the facts it built itself.
- Step 3
New vendor
Nexus pays GPU Vendor B, which the DAO hasn't approved yet.
Nexus → gpu-vendor-b.testnetrule: …How the contract guarantees this
Nexus pays GPU Vendor B, which nobody approved yet. The DAO's rule for new recipients is “hold”: after the pre-flight and a Sentinel audit with the offline stand-in model, the contract reserves the funds and waits for the DAO's vote. Nexus keeps its key.
More to try: set the DAO's limits, pay any invoice, a simpler forgery
Set the limits
You are the owner (a DAO). These rules live in the contract; no agent key can change them.
Enter a NEAR amount, e.g. 25 or 2.5
Enter a NEAR amount, e.g. 25 or 2.5
Paying a new recipient is treated as an attack. Blocked recipients are critical under either rule.
Pay any invoice
Nexus asks the contract about the recipient, the Sentinel audits the payment with the offline stand-in model, and the contract verifies the audit, applies the limits and transfers the NEAR.
Try more than the per-payment limit, or switch the vendor off in Set the limits.
The simpler forgery: a self-written prompt
Rhea skips the Sentinel and asks the model herself, with instructions she wrote. The answer carries a valid signature from the registered model key. Only the DAO-pinned prompt hash tells it apart.
Live network proofs (not the sandbox)
PhalanxSim above is a local rehearsal. This panel lists the public evidence: testnet transactions, the reproducible build and NEAR AI hardware attestation. pnpm verify:live re-checks all of it without a key, and the On-chain section below reads the deployment itself.
Live on NEAR testnet
The DAO-owned deployment, read from the chain in this tab: code, keys, agents, recipients, settlements, security log, treasury, governance and proofs.
phalanx-v3d4.phalanxswarm.testnet
Agent swarm
Four agents and one unvetted third party on scoped FunctionCall keys, hiring each other through RFPs and paid into on-chain balances.
Agent swarm around the PhalanxCore treasury
Task market
Nexus posts budgeted RFPs; workers bid in sealed commit-reveal or reverse-Dutch auctions. Bids need earned reputation, the promised latency becomes the deadline, and escrow is released only when the winner's signed model output verifies on-chain.
Market simulation
Twenty scripted worker agents bid for twelve procurement tasks on the compiled contract. The rules are the contract's: 16 sealed bids per auction, a 40% reputation floor, score = price 50% + latency 20% + reputation 30%, escrow paid only for verified work, −5% reputation for a missed deadline.
Customer orders
The business loop the DAO sells: a customer pays the product's exact price into escrow, the swarm procures exactly that spec through the auction market, and only a verified delivery turns the payment into revenue.
Customer orders
Treasury
Revenue vs. capital accounting, programmable on-chain splits and DAO-ready governance payloads.
Treasury vault
SputnikDAO / Trezu control plane
Owner is the DAO (phalanx-dao.sputnikv2.testnet in the sandbox). Export the add_proposal payload, then execute the same call here as the DAO owner. The testnet DAO's real proposals and votes are listed in On-chain.
- 1 · Propose
- 2 · Vote
- 3 · Execute
Security
On-chain policy engine: per-payment, epoch and velocity limits, approved recipients, the shared blocklist, price floors, EVM caps, circuit breaker and kill switch.
Policy firewall
Security events
Agent access & controls
Owner actions: freeze an active agent, or reinstate one the circuit breaker quarantined. Earnings are credited to each agent's on-chain balance; agents spend them with pay_from_balance or withdraw to their owner-set payout account.
Cross-chain settlement
Rehearsed cross-chain rebalances (1Click dry quotes, NEP-413, Sentinel audit, Chain Signatures) and the real payments: NEAR vendor transfers and MPC-signed EVM transactions.
Intent terminal
Rhea rehearses a cross-chain rebalance to the treasury's own MPC address: dry quote, NEP-413 signature, Sentinel audit, policy engine, MPC authorization. A dry run moves no funds and is booked as such.
Settlement ledger
Real NEAR payments, dry-run rehearsals and MPC-signed EVM transactions, as the contract stores them.
EVM transfers
Activity
Every transaction this tab sent to the sandbox contract, with receipts and NEP-297 events.
Transaction log
Newest first. Signer → method, transaction hash, NEP-297 events and the receipts each call produced.
No transactions yet
Contract calls from this tab appear here as they execute.